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unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of the UN charter, and to
intervention in the internal affairs of other states, including under the guise of
humanitarian intervention (quoted in Paul 2005: 63).
After the 2003 war in Iraq, Putin again travelled to India (December 2004)
and signed a joint declaration emphasizing the Russo-Indian strategic partner-
ship together with a number of agreements covering bilateral cooperation
regarding space exploration, energy, navigation, visa services and banking
(Kabila 2004). Moreover, Putin declared his support for India s candidacy as a
permanent member in a reformed UN Security Council with veto rights (Kabila
2004).
In terms of balancing and bandwagoning, the evidence indicates that Russia
sought actively to enrol India in some sort of diplomatic counter-US coalition
along with China. There was no hard balancing involved, however, as the two
nations did not forge an outright defence pact. Moreover, Moscow s attempts
to enlist India in the ranks of the disillusioned were complicated by India s
own policy of keeping its options open. At the same time as India and Russia
revamped their relationship, New Delhi also began to move closer to the
United States (Tellis 2006). Thus, Washington and Delhi struck a noteworthy
deal on civilian nuclear energy in 2006 following years of American sanctions
after India tested nuclear weapons in 1998 (BBC News 2006a; BBC News
2007a).
In short, the history of Russian relations with the United States and the
second-ranked major powers between 1989 and 2007 demonstrates a shift in
strategy vis-à-vis the US unipole away from soft bandwagoning to soft balanc-
ing. Soft balancing entailed that Russia sought to improve relations with other
second-ranked major powers and forge ad hoc coalitions with them against
particular US policies and to wedge some of the close US allies away from
America s orbit (the EU and Japan). Russian attempts at reducing American
influence and increasing its own were also evident in the Russian strategy
towards its close neighbours in the former Soviet area. This is the subject of the
next sub-section.
Keeping rivals out and the CIS onboard: Russia and its borderlands
Russian soft balancing in its relations with the major powers since the mid-
1990s was supported by a regional strategy in the borderlands.30 Much of
Moscow s influence in the borderlands evaporated with the Soviet collapse in
52 Russia
1991. Already by late 1992, however, Russia began to demonstrate a
borderland-strategy of preserving its remaining influence; and Moscow dis-
played efforts to regain influence in the borderlands. In particular, Moscow did
not welcome other major powers gaining ground in this strategically important
region.
For Russia, the borderlands have traditionally been highly important for eco-
nomic, security and cultural reasons. Being a landlocked power with no clear
natural borders, the strategic depth provided by the borderlands has served as a
buffer zone for Russia. Although strategic depth is less important for defence in
the nuclear age, the borderlands continue to play an important economic role;
not least the energy reserves of the Caspian region and control over the trans-
portation network for bringing oil and gas to world markets constitutes a vital
component in the Russian economic recovery after the Soviet collapse. The bor-
derlands also continue to play a role for security purposes, e.g. for avoiding
instability in South Caucasus from spilling over to Russia. Moreover, they play
an important role in a well-functioning Russian  early warning air- and missile
defence system in relation to radar stations. The borderlands also play an
important cultural role in Russian history and national myth (cf. Hoskings
1998). Finally, the borderlands represent the human and material resources
necessary for Russia to someday return to superpower status.
It is therefore important to analyse Russia s borderland strategy for under-
standing its overall approach to the American world order. Bandwagoning
would be evident to the extent that Russia would comply with possible Amer-
ican designs in the borderlands and in a comfortable attitude towards its loss of
relative influence in the post-Soviet space. Balancing would be indicated by
efforts to keep the influence of other powers at bay  especially the American
unipole  as well as in efforts to regain political clout in the strategically import-
ant area.
Apart from the voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops in the wake of the
Soviet dissolution in 1991 92 balancing elements aimed at restoring Russian
influence dominated Moscow s post-Cold War agenda in that area. The method
for restoring influence was not old-fashioned conquest, however. Instead, Russia
applied more subtle and indirect methods of  divide-and-rule ,  blackmail , and
 binding (cf. Toft 2006). Russia primarily adopted an institutional approach
within the multilateral framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS); a loose organization comprising most of the former Soviet republics.
Moscow attempted to use the CIS structure to bind the other former Soviet
republics politically to the Russian orbit. The means were beneficial agreements
(carrots) using Russia s key position as the main provider of military security
and economic opportunity in the former Soviet space. A bilateral approach was
also employed, though primarily towards the former Soviet republics that were
less susceptible to persuasion. In those cases, Russia used more heavy-handed
methods, including blackmail and divide-and-rule.
Russia 53
The Commonwealth of Independent States
When the Soviet Union broke apart in late 1991, Russia, the Ukraine and
Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 8 December
1991. The official purpose of the organization was rather diffuse, but there was
agreement among the three founding states to establish a mechanism to facilitate
working relations between the newly independent former Soviet republics in the
wake of the disintegration of the USSR. Other former Soviet republics quickly
joined. By 21 December 1991, 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics had joined
the CIS. The three Baltic republics, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, remained
aloof, however, as they became quickly associated closely with the EU and
NATO. Georgia withdrew its membership in 1992 (Brzezinski and Sullivan
1997: 43, 47; Garnett 1998: 88 90; Webber and Sakwa 1999: 403).31
After the founding of the CIS, it became evident that Russia did not view the
organization as a club of strictly equal members. Rather, it appears as though the
Russian government perceived the organization as a tool for re-gaining political
clout and leadership within the former Soviet space by promoting the CIS as a
platform for some sort of re-integration of the ex-Soviet republics under Russian
suzerainty (Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997: 44; Webber and Sakwa 1999:
384 385, 404). Consecutive Russian governments thus ensured that Russian
personnel dominated all key CIS structures, including most of the lower levels
of intergovernmental decision making. Russia also provided all of the key per- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]